A Historical Note on Hodgson v. Bowerbank
Dennis J. Mahoneyt
After Marbury v. Madison1 the Supreme Court did not hold
another federal law unconstitutional until the Dred Scott decision.2 This at least is the received version of American constitutional history, reported in textbooks and popular works alike, by
lawyers, s political scientists,4 and historians; 5 this is what one
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1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
3 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 14 (1962); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 386 (1980); W. 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF
LIBERTY 227 (1954); C. FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 31 (rev. ed. 1950); 1
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L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 301 (1973); C. E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT
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THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 978 (1953); R. E. CUSHMAN & R. F. CUSHMAN, CASES IN
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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, at 120 (1944); A. MASON & W. BEANEY,
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1979); C. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 107 (1943); S. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 39 (1978); Mason, Preface to J. COTTON, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JOHN MARSHALL, xiv-xv (reprint 1969). See also C. HAINES,
THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 341-42, 567 (2d ed. 1959); B. WRIGHT,
GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 131-32 n.2 (1919); H. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 47-48, 89 n.43 (1943); H. HoCKgrT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1826, at 308 (1939); A. McLAUGHLIN, A

317 (1935); C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE
135 n.1, 273 (1925); 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 533 n.2 (rev. ed. 1926). See also D. FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED ScoTT CASE 223 (1978); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 218
CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:725

learns from compilations prepared by the Court's own reporter
and by the Library of Congress.'
Within the last three decades, however, some very distinguished legal scholars have begun to write of a second Marshall
Court decision that held a provision of a congressional act unconstitutional-the obscure 1809 case of Hodgson v. Bowerbank.8
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler apparently were the first to notice the implications of the case. Their discussion of Hodgson appears in their commentary on National Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co.,9 in which Chief Justice Fred Vinson, dissenting, cited Hodgson.10 Concerning the earlier case, Hart and
Wechsler noted that "the Court in a short opinion by Marshall declared unconstitutional a provision of the First Judiciary Act purporting to give the federal courts jurisdiction in 'all suits' in which
an alien was a party."' A similar interpretation was offered by
Charles Alan Wright:
The 1789 Judiciary Act purported to extend jurisdiction to all
suits in which an alien is a party. The Court at a very early
date held that this was unconstitutional insofar as it might
permit suit in federal courts between two aliens, while the
Constitution only authorizes jurisdiction of suits between a
citizen of a state and an alien.1 2
This revisionist interpretation of Hodgson was initially confined to works on federal courts and jurisdiction. Recently, however, it has begun to appear in casebooks on constitutional law.
Edward L. Barrett and William Cohen, in the most recent edition
of their casebook, write:
(5th ed. 1976).
8 See 131 U.S. app., at ccxxxv-ccxxxvii (1889) (but not citing Dred Scott).
See LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PROVISIONS OF
LAW HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2,

FEDERAL

87-91, 130-

31,

139, 141 (1936); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONsTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1597-1619 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as CRS].

9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
9 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
8

10 Id. at 637.
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"fC. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 70 (1963), reprinted in id. at
93 (3d ed. 1976). A footnote identifies the case cited as Hodgson. Id. at 70 n.9, reprinted in
id. at 93 n.10 (3d ed. 1976).
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During the tenure of Marshall as Chief Justice, the only other
case [besides Marbury] holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional was the obscure decision in Hodgson v. Bowerbank
....

In a brief opinion, Marshall held a provision of the Ju-

diciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional in conferring jurisdiction
on federal courts to try suits between aliens."
And Gerald Gunther, in the most recent edition of his casebook,
observes that "[a]fter Marbury, the Court did not hold another
major federal law unconstitutional until the controversial and illfated decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford."1 4 Gunther's statement
pointedly leaves open the possibility that the Court in this interval
held a "minor" federal law unconstitutional. Although the statute
at issue in Hodgson was the Judiciary Act of 1789-the same "major" federal law at issue in Marbury-it is likely that Gunther intends an oblique reference to Hodgson.
Proponents of this reinterpretation of Hodgson also include
Leonard Baker, the author of a recent biography of John Marshall:
In an 1809 case, Hodgson and Thompson v. Bowerbank and
Others, Marshall ruled expressly on the question whether
Congress can broaden the Constitution by legislation. The
case involved two aliens, and Congress had given the Circuit
Courts jurisdiction over cases involving aliens....

Asserting

that the Constitution did not authorize such jurisdiction, he
declared that "the objection was fatal." 5
The purpose of this historical note is to determine whether we
are justified in understanding Hodgson as an instance in which the
Marshall Court held unconstitutional a provision of a congressional
act. The Hodgson case is not very important in itself, but the
spreading acceptance of the reinterpretation of the case potentially
affects our understanding of the history of judicial review and even
of what it means for a court to hold a law "unconstitutional."
I
What can we learn from a careful reading of Chief Judge William Cranch's report of the Hodgson case? 6
BARR Tr & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 34 n.c (6th ed. 1981).
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 n.* (10th ed. 1980) (emphasis added). Compare

13 E.
14

Gunther's language in the ninth edition. G.

GUNTHER,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 15 n.* (9th ed.

1975) (omitting qualifier "major").

"L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE
The complete report is as follows:

IN THE LAW

551 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
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Evidently Bowerbank and others, British subjects, brought
suit against Hodgson and Thompson in the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Maryland. The circuit court, comprised of
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase and District Judge James
Houston, accepted "late of the district of Maryland" as a sufficient
description of the defendants'
status, heard the suit, and decided
17
in favor of the plaintiffs.

Hodgson and Thompson then carried the case to the Supreme
Court on a writ of error.1 8 Their counsel, Luther Martin,19 argued
that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the suit,
because the complaint established that the plaintiffs below were
aliens but did not allege that the defendants were citizens of one of
the United States. 20 Counsel for Bowerbank, Charles Lee,2 1 replied

by arguing that section 11 of the Judiciary Act,22 standing alone,
Hodgson & Thompson
V.
Bowerbank and others
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland. The defendants below
were described in the record as "late of the district of Maryland, merchants," but were
not stated to be citizens of the state of Maryland. The plaintiffs were described as
"aliens and subjects of the king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland."
Martin contended, that the courts of the United States had not jurisdiction, it not
being stated that the defendants were citizens of any state.
C. Lee, contra. The judiciary act gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts, in all suits
in which an alien is a party. Laws U.S. vol. 1. p. 55. § 11.
Marshall, Ch. J. Turn to the article of the constitution of the United States, for
the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution.
(The words of the Constitution were found to be "between a state, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.")
The court said the objection was fatal.
The record was afterwards amended by consent.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303-04 (1809).
17

Id. at 303.

Is Id.
19 Martin was a Maryland delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Attorney General
of Maryland, and one of the most distinguished members of the Supreme Court bar. See P.
CLARKSON & R. JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 41, 69, 273-85 (1970); H. CUMMINGS &

C.

McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE

70 (1937); 12

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY

343-45

(D. Malone ed. 1933); J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
215 (1971).
20 See 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 303; supra note 16.
21 Lee was one of the leading Federalist lawyers of the time, had served as Attorney
General under Presidents Washington and Adams, and had been Marbury's counsel in Marbury v. Madison. See H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, supra note 19, at 46-47, 55, 70; 11
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 101-02; J. GOEBEL, supra note 19, at
582, 683.
22 Section 11 read in full:
And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common

1982]

Hodgson v. Bowerbank

required only that one party to the suit be an alien, and that the
circuit court then had jurisdiction regardless of the status of the
other parties.2 3
Chief Justice Marshall replied to Lee's argument with the instruction to "[tiurn to the article of the constitution of the United
States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the
limits of the constitution. 2 4 Marshall's instruction was no mere
rhetorical flourish, for apparently someone then consulted the
Constitution and read the words of article III, section 2: "The judicial Power shall extend. . . to Controversies. .. between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
25
The Court then announced that "the objection was fatal."
The circumstances indicate that the objection must have been that
raised by Martin-that the record was inadequate to establish the
jurisdiction of the circuit court-and not, as the revisionists suppose, an objection by Marshall to the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the record
was afterward amended;2 '6 had the provision been held unconstitutional, there would have been no possible amendment of the record
that could have materially affected the disposition of the case.
There can be no doubt that the meaning of the Court's decision was that, irrespective of the literal wording of the Judiciary
Act, a circuit court could not take jurisdiction of a case unless it
appeared on the record that one of the parties was a citizen of a
state. As Chief Justice Vinson said, "the Court refused to give literal effect" to the alien clause.2 7 It is probably true to say, as David
P. Currie does, that "the original statute granting jurisidiction
whenever an alien was a party was narrowed on constitutional
grounds"; 28 or as Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis did, that
it was "confined by judicial interpretation"; 9 or as Charles Warren

law or equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value
of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien
is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (emphasis in original). The current alien
jurisdiction provisions are found at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) & (3) (1976).
" See 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 304; supra note 16.
4 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 304.
25 Id.
Is Id.

'7 National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 637 (1949) (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting).
I D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 447 (2d ed. 1975).
,3 F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 8 n.15 (1927).
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did, that the Court "read into [section 11] a limitation which it did
not actually contain." 30 All of this demonstrates what the Congressional Research Service calls "the meticulous care manifested [by
the Court] in this case.""1 None of these authorities, however, concludes that in so acting the Court held any part of the section
unconstitutional.
One of the strategies available to the Court to avoid passing
on the constitutionality of an act is to construe the statute narrowly. There is a very fine line between a ruling that a statute does
not apply in particular cases and a ruling that the statute is unconstitutional insofar as it applies to such cases. If a more restrictive,
less literal construction of a statute constitutes a holding of unconstitutionality, then there was such a holding in Hodgson. But if
that is so, Hodgson was not the first case in which the disputed
clause of section 11 was held to be unconstitutional. 2
If narrow statutory construction or the "reading into" the statute of a constitutional limitation is not alone sufficient to amount
to a holding of unconstitutionality, then the Hart-Wechsler-Wright
reinterpretation of Hodgson depends upon one of two possibilities.
Either Congress must have intended to extend the jurisdiction of
the federal courts beyond the limits set by article III, or there
must be no way to read the statute other than as so extending the
jurisdiction.
Hart and Wechsler write of the "attempt" of Congress to confer extraconstitutional jurisdiction,"3 and Currie says that Congress
"tried" to give it." Wright,3 5 and Hart and Wechsler in another
passage,3 6 use forms of the more ambiguous word "purport." To
"attempt" and to "try" clearly connote intention; to "purport"
may convey intention, but also may signify the meaning inferred
by the reader or listener, regardless of the user's intention. To
some extent, at least, the revisionist interpretation of Hodgson depends upon a particular understanding of what Congress intended
when it passed section 11. The inquiry thus turns to Congress's
30 Warren, New Light on the History of the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49,
79 (1923).
31 CRS, supra note 7, at 746.
32 See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
33 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 889, reprinted in id. at 1061 (2d ed. 1973).
3, D. CURRiE, supra note 28, at 182.
" C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 17, 70, reprinted in id. at 20, 93 (3d ed. 1976)
("purported").
38 HaRT & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 372, reprinted in id. at 417 (2d ed. 1973)
("purporting").
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intent.

The First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 during its
first session. 87 Unfortunately, the history of that Act is shrouded in
mystery because the debates of the Senate were then secret, and
amendments made in the Senate and House of Representatives
were not recorded in any detail.3 8 Nevertheless, there is some basis
for inferring Congress's intent in passing the disputed clause.
The Senate achieved a quorum to do business on April 6, 1789,
and the next day appointed a committee "to bring in a bill for
organizing the judiciary of the United States."3 9 Just over two
months later, the committee completed a bill "to establish the judicial courts of the United States. ' 40 Although Richard Henry Lee
reported the bill, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, a distinguished
expert on the judiciary, was its principal draftsman. 41 There is no
evidence to suggest why Ellsworth's bill conferred jurisdiction on
the circuit courts in suits where "an alien is a party' ' 2 rather than
simply reciting the more restrictive language of the Constitution.
There is evidence, however, of what he thought his words meant.
On April 30, 1789, he wrote to Judge Richard Law of Connecticut:
The following are the outlines of a judiciary system con27 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified and amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(1976)); J. GOESEL, supra note 19, at 507; Warren, supra note 30, at 49, 131.
See Warren, supra note 30, at 49 & n.2.
39

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 (J. Gales ed. 1789). Ten of the Senate's 20 members-John

Langdon, Caleb Strong, Oliver Ellsworth, William Samuel Johnson, William Paterson, Robert Morris, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler, and William Few-had been at the
Convention. W.

MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DaBT

IN THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

1

(1880). Of these, Ellsworth, Paterson, Strong, Bassett, and Few served on the committee to
draft the Judiciary Bill. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 (J. Gales ed. 1789). At least two committee
members-William Maclay and Richard Henry Lee-were strong states' rights men who
opposed the creation of a separate federal judiciary. See Warren, supra note 30, at 109, 114.
4" 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 47 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
41 W. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 184-97 (1905); J. GOEBEL, supra note 19,
at 459-60; W. MACLAY, supra note 39, at 90; Warren, supra note 30, at 59-60. Ellsworth had
been one of the most active members of the Constitutional Convention, see M. FARuAND,
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

124, 200 (1913), and a member of

its committee of detail, id. at 122, 124; J. GOEBEL, supranote 19, at 232. He was previously a
judge of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, M. FARRAND, supra, at 34-35, and after serving
in the Senate he was Chief Justice of the United States, J. GOEBEL, supra note 19, at 749.
The judiciary was Ellsworth's special field of expertise, and he apparently drafted two supplementary laws during the first session of Congress, in addition to the Judiciary Act. See
W. BROWN, supra, at 197.
42 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2) (1976)); see supra note 22.
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templating before a committee of the Senate.
That the United States be divided into three circuits.
That a court be holden twice annually in each State ....
This court to...
have original jurisdiction in law and equity,
in controversies between foreigners and citizens . . . s
How it happened that Ellsworth was able to use unambiguous language to describe the system he was designing even while inserting
into the draft bill words that would later occasion confusion is
something that will probably never be explained. But it seems
clear that his intention was to extend the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts to precisely the same class of cases involving aliens as the
Constitution brought within the federal judicial power.
Most of the debate on the Judiciary Act centered on the, very
idea of creating inferior federal courts and the asserted invasion of
state court jurisdiction that would result.44 Although states' rights
champions jealously resisted the bill, the words of the alien clause
of section 11 passed unchallenged (at least insofar as we have any
record). Even Pennsylvania's Senator William Maclay, a member
of the committee who opposed virtually every provision of Ellsworth's draft and who delighted in finding instances "where Ellsworth in his diction had varied from the Constitution,' 4 did not
object on the record to the wording of the disputed clause.
In the recorded debates of the House of Representatives, only
one member objected to giving the circuit courts jurisdiction when
an alien was a party to a suit. Representative Michael Stone of
Maryland complained that "the Senate, by this bill, have given us
this construction: foreigners may sue and be sued in all the States.
This has already been done; do gentlemen now contend, that these
suits shall be exclusively in the Continental Courts? ' 46 Even here,
Stone assumed that cases involving foreigners would involve citizens as the adversary parties. Indeed, his objection was precisely
that the federal judiciary would be insufficiently solicitous of the
rights of citizens in their controversies with foreigners. It does not
seem to have occurred to any of the participants in the debates
that the federal alienage jurisdiction would include a controversy
in which no domestic citizen was a party.

4
44

"Quotedin W. BROWN, supra note 41, at 188-89.
See Warren, supra note 30, at 65-67, 81-82, 96-97, 109, 123, 127.

" W. MACLAY, supra note 39, at 90.
" 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 857 (J. Gales ed.

1789).
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If the wording of the alien clause of section 11 is ambiguous,
Congress seems to have been the victim of Ellsworth's literary
style. Discussing the jurisdictional provisions in the Judiciary Act,
Edmund Randolph 4 7 complained in a letter to Congressman James
Madison that "[t]he jurisdiction is inartificially untechnically and
confusedly worded. Would it not have been sufficient to have left
this point upon the constitution itself?."'48 Randolph did not accuse
Ellsworth of any unconstitutional design; rather he complained of
Ellsworth's clumsiness in executing a constitutional one.
It is possible, of course, that Ellsworth's grammar was even
worse than his diction. He actually may have intended the part of
the paragraph following "the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners" 49 to mean that a case must be between an alien or a citizen of one state on one side, and a citizen of a[nother] state on the
other side. Mere inattention or imprecision thus may have caused
the provision to be grammatically problematic, albeit constitutionally impeccable in its intent. Because the Supreme Court never
adopted this reading, however, a thesis built on Ellsworth's faulty
grammar cannot explain what the Court did respecting the alien
clause. In theory, however, the thesis provides a way to deny that
Congress intended to transgress constitutional limits.
A fair interpretation of the available evidence is that Congress
intended to do no more than to distribute among the three tiers of
the new federal judiciary the bulk of the constitutionally ordained
judicial power of the United States. Whether through a lapse of
imagination, a failure of literary style, or some other cause, Congress expressed that intent inexactly, using words that could, but
did not necessarily, bear an interpretation that could carry them
beyond the constitutional pale.
InI
The Hart-Wechsler-Wright revisionist interpretation of Hodgson's significance does not consider the case law context of the decision. Read in context, Hodgson is but one of a series of cases in
which the Court either construed section 11 so as to make it constitutional, or embraced the idea that statutes should be construed
47 Randolph had been a leading member of the Constitutional Convention and was
about to become the nation's first attorney general. See H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND,
supra note 19, at 18-19; M. FARRAND, supra note 41, at 124, 199.
42 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (June 30, 1789), reprinted in 12
PAPERs OF JAMES MADISON 274 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1979).
4' See supra note 22.
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to avoid conflicts with "higher" law.
The first case in which the alien clause of section 11 was at
issue was Mossman v. Higginson,50 decided in 1800, prior to John
Marshall's tenure on the Court. Higginson, a merchant and a British subject, sued Mossman, the executor of the estate of a deceased
debtor. The complaint asserted that Higginson was an alien, but
said nothing of Mossman's citizenship. 51 The case went to the Supreme Court on a writ of error from the Circuit Court for the District of Georgia.52 Mossman was represented by Jared Ingersoll,"
who argued that "[t]he judiciary act was only intended to carry the
constitution into effect, and cannot amplify, or alter its provisions.
The constitution nowhere gives jurisdiction (nor has any judge ever
countenanced the idea) in suits between alien and alien."5
The Court evidently found Ingersoll's argument convincing.
Its per curiam opinion held that
the eleventh section of the judiciary act can and must receive
a construction consistent with the constitution. It says, it is
true, in general terms, that the circuit court shall have
cognisance of suits "where an alien is a party;" but as the legislative power of conferring a jurisdiction on the federal
courts, is in this respect, confined to suits between citizens
and foreigners, we must so expound the terms of the law, as to
meet the case, "where, indeed, an alien is one party," but a
citizen is the other.55
This case is an almost exact parallel of Hodgson. The plaintiff
below in each case was a British subject, and each stated so in his
complaint. The defendant in each case objected to the federal circuit court taking jurisdiction because the complaint did not affirmatively allege that the defendant was a citizen of a state. In each
case the Supreme Court ruled that the objection was fatal. What
distinguished Mossman, besides its relatively early date, is the
Court's clear statement of what it was doing-construing the alien
clause of section 11 to find it constitutional." In so holding, it fol- 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800).
at 12.

5 Id.
52Id.

53 Ingersoll had been a Pennsylvania delegate to the Constitutional Convention. 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 558 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937).
- 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 13.
" Id. at 14. The Court's opinion began by noting that "[t]he decisions on this subject
govern the present case." Id.
"See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CHi. L. REv.
819, 821, 851-53 (1981).
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lowed a rule that has become a fundamental maxim of constitutional law: the Court interprets ambiguous statutes with the presumption that Congress intended to enact constitutionally sound
legislation, and, wherever possible, narrows the literal scope of congressional language in accordance with this presumption. 7
The Court in Hodgson seems to have followed this rule of construction, and to assert otherwise is to claim for Hodgson double
significance: not only did the Court hold an act of Congress unconstitutional; it also overruled, albeit tacitly, a previous decision. The
report of Hodgson is not adequate to sustain such a reading.
Although there is no pre-Hodgson Marshall Court case endorsing the general rule of construction followed in Mossman, the 1804
admiralty case of Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy' 8
shows that Marshall was open to this rule. In that case, he endorsed the proposition that "an act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains. ''5 If Marshall was willing to construe a federal
statute as consistent with international law whenever possible,
might he not be assumed to be willing to do the same with respect
to the Constitution, the "superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means"?60
Another case between Mossman and Hodgson brought the
alien clause of section 11 before the Marshall Court. In Montalet v.
Murray,61 both original parties to the suit were aliens. This fact
was made the basis of the jurisdictional objection, and section 11
was cited in support of that objection.62 Moreover, according to the
report, "the court was unanimously of the opinion that the courts
of the United States have no jurisdiction of cases between
aliens."6 When counsel suggested that the alienage of both parties
57

For a later elaboration of this rule, see Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448-

49 (1830) (Story, J.) ("No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to
give a construction to it, which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the
constitution."). See also Justice Story's statement of this rule in United States v. Coombs,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 76 (1838):
[I]f the section admits of two interpretations, one of which brings it within, and the
other presses it beyond, the constitutional authority of congress, it will become our
duty to adopt the former construction; because a presumption never ought to be indulged, that congress meant to exercise or usurp any constitutional authority, unless
that conclusion is forced upon the court by language altogether unambiguous.
5 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
Id. at 118.
" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46 (1807).
61 Id. at 47.
63 Id. (emphasis in original).
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was not conclusively shown upon the record, Chief Justice Marshall replied "that if it did not appear upon the record that the
character of the original parties would support the jurisdiction,
that objection was equally fatal, under the uniform decisions of
this court."'" The "uniform decisions" presumably included
Mossman.
Moreover, the Marshall Court shortly after Hodgson applied
of narrow construction to another section of the Judiciary
rule
the
Act. In Owings v. Norwood's Lessee,65 the Court of Appeals of Maryland had ruled against a defendant in an ejectment action, who
had incidentally drawn upon the possible claim of a third party
based on Jay's Treaty. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act authorized
reexamination by the Supreme Court of the final judgment of the
highest state court in any suit "where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of a treaty, and the decision is against the
right claimed under such clause of the treaty." 66 Announcing the
opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Marshall said that the Court
did not have the power to review the case, notwithstanding the
wording of section 25, because Owings's case did not arise under
the treaty within the meaning of the Constitution. Marshall declared that "[t]he 25th section of the judiciary act must be restrained by the constitution, the words of which are, 'all cases arising under treaties.' "867 The Court thus held that the scope
suggested by the words of section 25 was narrowed by reading section 25 along with article H. This was neither more nor less than
the Court did in Hodgson with respect to section 11. If it is correct
to say that some aspect of section 11 was held unconstitutional in
Hodgson, then by the same logic, some aspect of section 25 was
held unconstitutional in Owings. Yet that interpretation has nowhere been asserted.
When Hodgson was decided, then, it had long been settled
that the circuit courts did not have jurisdiction over cases in which
it was not shown that one party was a citizen of one of the United
States. Moreover, both the Marshall Court and its predecessor had
embraced the doctrine of construing ambiguous statutes consistently with the Constitution. In this light, it seems that Hodgson
did no more than rectify an aberrant circuit court decision, proba-

Id.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809).
Id. at 345 (paraphrasing 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1257(1) (1976)).
67 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 347 (emphasis omitted).
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bly a mere oversight on the part of the circuit judges, and bring
about a result compatible with the Court's previous decisions."
IV
The assertion that there was a holding of unconstitutionality
in Hodgson is of very recent origin. Neither Chancellor James
Kent nor Justice Joseph Story, in their classic commentaries on
American law and the Constitution, attributed to Hodgson the.significance accorded it by the Hart-Wechsler-Wright thesis. Kent
treated the issue of alien-versus-alien jurisdiction under the disputed clause as settled by Mossman8 ' and reaffirmed by Montalet
and Hodgson.7 0 Story, in discussing the same point, did not mention these cases, but cited as authority the 1829 case of Jackson v.
Twentyman.7 1 The Jackson report shows that the Court was aware
of Hodgson during its deliberations: counsel for the plaintiff in error had cited it as precedent.7 2 The issue was the same as in Mossman and Hodgson: the plaintiff below was described on the record
as a British subject, and the citizenship of the defendants was not
averred, but the circuit court nevertheless heard the suit.7 The
Supreme Court's opinion reversing this decision is important. If
the Marshall Court had already held the alien clause unconstitutional to the extent it permitted jurisdiction where neither party to
a suit was a citizen of a state, the members of the Court should
have known it. And if they knew that to be the case, they might
reasonably be expected to have said so. Instead, the Court held
that section 11
must be construed in connection with, and in conformity to,
There is, in fact, good reason to believe that the jurisdictional objection had not been
raised at the circuit court level, but was first made on appeal. The Supreme Court Justice
who sat with the district judge on the circuit court in Maryland was Samuel Chase, who had
been on the Court when it decided Mossman, see Currie, supra note 56, at 820, and.who
therefore was surely aware of the precedent.
6* 1 J. KENT, COM NTARIES ON AMEmcAN LAw 323 (New York 1826) (footnote
omitted):
The judiciary act of 1789, sec. 11, gives jurisdiction to the circuit court where an alien
is a party;, and it was decided in Mossman v. Higginson, that the jurisdiction was confined to the case of suits between citizens and foreigners, and did not extend to suits
between alien and alien; and that if it appeared on the record that one party was an
alien, it must likewise appear affirmatively, that the other party was a citizen.
70 Id. at 323-24.
71 3 J. STORY, COMMNzwRiS ON THE CONsTrrTuON OF THz UNrrTD STATES 571 (Boston
1833) (citing 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136 (1829)).
7- 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 136.
73 Id.
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the constitution of the United States. That, by the latter, the
judicial power was not extended to private suits, in which an
alien is a party, unless a citizen be the adverse party. It was
indispensable, therefore, to aver the citizenship of the defendants, in order to show, on the record, the jurisdiction of the
court. The omission so to do was fatal, and according to the
known course of the decisions of the court, the judgment of
the circuit court must be reversed, for want of jurisdiction. 4
5
The language of the Court's opinion recalls that in Mossman;7
once again, the Court construed the disputed clause in conformity
with the Constitution. If Hodgson overruled Mossman on that
point, as it must have done if it comprised a holding of unconstitutionality, then Jackson overruled Hodgson, because Jackson restored the rule of Mossman. This is a rather tortured reading of
these cases. The argument that the Court simply forgot what it
had done in previous cases would be unacceptable even if the report did not show that counsel had cited the previous cases. Defenders of the Hart-Wechsler-Wright thesis must answer this question: given that Marshall pronounced the alleged holding of
unconstitutionality in Hodgson, and that Marshall was still Chief
Justice when Jackson was decided, why is there no acknowledgment of the overruling of the earlier case?
Hodgson has been cited in many federal court opinions since
the Marshall era, including opinions of the Supreme Court.76 It
continues to be cited as authority for "the requirement that diver-

sity jurisdiction must be specifically pleaded, ' ' 7 as well as for the

limitation on congressional power to define the jurisdiction of federal courts78 and the proposition that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over suits between aliens. 9 But it has never been cited
in a reported federal court opinion as an instance where the Supreme Court held an act of Congress to be unconstitutional.
74Id.
7 See 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 14.
76 See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 390 n.1 (1959)
(separate opinion of Brennan, J.); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337
U.S. 582, 637 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444,

447 (1892); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 340 (1853) (Daniel, J.,
dissenting); McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9, 22 (1844) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
7 Gavelek v. Coscol Petroleum Corp., 491 F. Supp. 188, 190 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1979); see
also Hodas v. Lindsay, 431 F. Supp. 637, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (the "essential elements of

diversity jurisdiction must be affimatively alleged in the pleadings").
78
'

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1980).
Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293, 296 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981).
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V
Thus far in this inquiry, I have accepted the assumption that
the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Hodgson constituted an informal opinion of the Court. The Hart-Wechsler-Wright thesis
rests on this assumption; it may be false, however.
It was the habit of Chief Judge Cranch, at least throughout
the fifth volume of his reports, to record the colloquy between the
Justices and counsel during oral argument.80 The status of this colloquy is uncertain at best, and very often it shows a Justice arguing a position at odds with his final opinion. Cranch usually introduced the opinion of the Court with the formula, "Marshall, Ch. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court,"81 or, in the case of a per curiam
opinion, "the Court said .... ,, The practice was not invariable,
however, and so it is not conclusive in this case. In the Hodgson
report, Marshall's statement is followed by the information that
"the words of the constitution were found to be..

.

indicating

that someone other than Marshall had, in response to his direction,
turned to the article of the Constitution and read it aloud to the
Court. This fact suggests that Marshall's statement was not the
opinion of the Court but part of a dialogue with Charles Lee.
Moreover, the reading of the Constitution is followed by a sentence
beginning, "[t]he Court said ... ,"
ranch's formula for introducing a per curiam opinion.
VI
The weight of the evidence is against the position of Professors Hart, Wechsler, and Wright that there was a holding of unconstitutionality in Hodgson v. Bowerbank. First, there is no evi3o On Cranch as Supreme Court reporter, see generally N. Kramer, Half a Century Past
Midnight: The Life and Times of Judge William Cranch 135-50 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1978).
" See, e.g., Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 316 (1809); Harrison v. Sterry, 9

U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 298 (1809); United States v. Arthur, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 257, 261 (1809).
82 See, e.g., Whelan v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 112, 112 (1812); The Schooner
Rachel v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 329, 330 (1810); Logan v. Patrick, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 288, 288-89 (1809). Cf. Sloop Sally v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 372, 374
(1809) ("the Court was of opinion that. .. "); Dulany v. Hodgkin, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 333,

334 (1809) ("... the Court ... Affimed.. ."); Welsh v. Mandeville 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 321,
321 (1809) ("The Court refused. . ."); Browne v. Strode, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303 (1809)
("The Court ordered it to be certified, as their opinion, that. . ."); Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 57, 61 (1809) ("The Court ... decided. . ."). But see Woods v.
Young, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 237, 238 (1808) ("By the Court.") (unique example of this form).
93 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 304. See supra note 16.
4

Id.
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dence that Congress intended in section 11 to extend the
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the constitutional limits
of the judicial power of the United States. Neither the author of
the Act, nor any participant in the debates-including the most
vocal opponents of the Act-ever suggested such an intent. Second, the disputed clause already had been the subject of litigation
before the Supreme Court and had been construed so as to make it
wholly constitutional. Such a rule of construction was consistent
with the way the Court handled other ambiguous sections of the
Judiciary Act. Third, the Court in construing the same clause as
constitutional in a subsequent case, decided under the same Chief
Justice and with the Hodgson opinion cited in argument, did not
admit to overruling, or even distinguishing, Hodgson. Finally, there
is no reason to believe that the words alleged to constitute the
holding of unconstitutionality are in fact part of the Court's
opinion.
The reinterpretation of Hodgson proposed by Professors Hart,
Wechsler, and Wright, endorsed by Professors Barrett and Cohen,
and implicitly acknowledged by Professor Gunther, cannot be accepted. The case of Hodgson v. Bowerbank should be allowed to
return to the obscurity from which it has only recently been
resurrected.

